FY 11 Recon Summit
Summary of Outcomes (Doctrine)

Corps	Division	Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons		
BFSB		IBCT	SBCT	HBCT

BFSB

- BFSB FSO METL does not include the Screen Mission
- Insufficient Recon, Surveillance and MI Discipline Collection Teaming Doctrine
- Update BFSB doctrinal mission set to include security operations(e.g. screen and below)
- Address BFSB employment within the context of WASO/CAM
- Continue development of TC 3-5.11 (Recon & Collection Teaming) & ICOE TC, TBD on MFT employment

Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons

- Current reconnaissance doctrine must evolve to enable
  recon and security operations in support of WASO/CAM:

  ▪ Requirement/role for chief of reconnaissance?

  ▪ Increased requirement for air-ground integration in WASO

  ▪ Include IED defeat in FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and*
    Cavalry Squadron; IEDs are an enduring characteristic of the
    OE

  ▪ Address hybrid threats use of technology to create/exploit
    ethical dilemmas with strategic implications

  ▪ Transition between CAM & WAS affects mission command
    implementation at the Squadron level and below

  ▪ IPB is remains a continuous process

FY 11 Recon Summit
Summary of Outcomes (Organization)

Corps	Division	Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons		
BFSB		IBCT	SBCT	HBCT

BFSB:

- 18 Man Scout Platoons severely limit recon & collection teaming required by WASO

- Insufficient 120mm & 60/81mm mortar capability to enable distributed WASO

- Organic TUAS required to meet WASO enroute time, distance and loiter time requirements

- No organic non-lethal WASO capability in BFSB

- Expand horizontal/vertical info sharing down to dismounted scouts (UAS, HUMINT, etc)

- Precision small arms Capability (sniper/SDM) required at Platoon level

Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons:

- IBCT, SBCT & HBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons are not optimized to support WASO/CAM:

    - Insufficient dismounted recon capability to conduct surveillance and interact with local officials

    - Limited unmanned capabilities; no organic non-lethal WASO capability

    - Expand horizontal/vertical info sharing down to dismounted scouts (UAS, HUMINT, etc)

    - Do WASO/CAM and the complexity of the OE require a different grade/experience for reconnaissance leaders?

    - Dismounted recon teams lack sufficient capability to laser designate targets

    - OSVRT required down to troop level dismounted scouts

Fort Benning, Home of the

Corps	Division	Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons		
BFSB		IBCT	SBCT	HBCT

BFSB

- BFSB Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) lacks multi-echelon reconnaissance and collection teaming STX training plans

- Insufficient collective training doctrine and integrating battle drills to enable WASO & CAM

- Develop WASO and CAM recon and intelligence team qualification standards for surveillance and collection team training

- Integrate BFSBs into CTC training rotations to fully exercise the organization's recon and collection capabilities

- Develop a home station integrated training environment to (ITE) to enable LVCG recon and collection training

Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons

- Leader training requirements for WASO/CAM require revisions
  and adaptations to institutional training:

  - Replace demolition training with IED/counter IED training in
    OES/NCOES for recon soldiers/leaders

  - WASO/CAM requires higher level of proficiency with digital
    systems

  - Air/ground integration training at Troop level & below

  - Leaders must anticipate/mitigate the effects of adverse
    information (social media, television, internet

  - Align JFO course to ARFORGEN to increase JFO qualified Soldiers; re-examine JTAC authorizations in Recon Squadrons

  - Revise Modular BCT Reconnaissance Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) to leverage LVCG to better replicate and train the complexity

Fort Benning, Home of the

Corps	Division	Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons		
BFSB		IBCT	SBCT	HBCT

- Expand leader development to prepare leaders for the moral and ethical challenges associated with reconnaissance
  operations in WAS/CAM:

  - How do we adapt our leader development model to expose leaders to the moral and ethical challenges posed
    by hybrid threats?

  - How do we develop the negotiation, reasoning and conflict resolution skills necessary for Leaders to adapt and operate effectively under conditions of ambiguity?

- Review/update existing leader development models to better prepare leaders to operate effectively amidst the
  challenges and demands of WAS/CAM:

- How can we train junior reconnaissance leaders to build the base of experience necessary to transition seamlessly between WASO and CAM?

- How do we integrate and train mission command as a function of leader development?

- How do we train Operational Adaptability as function of leader development?

Corps	Division	Modular BCT Reconnaissance Squadrons		
BFSB		IBCT	SBCT	HBCT

- Requirement for a dedicated Light Reconnaissance vehicle with organic surveillance, multidiscipline
  collection and reporting capabilities, improved mobility / survivability and a precision RWS capability to support
  WASO and CAM.

- Dismounted scout teams require tailor able access to the same information as networked platforms (e.g. BFT,
  TIGRNET, UAS feeds, etc) as well as a light weight, extended duration and long range surveillance system

- BFSB LRS have a requirement for a mobile platform to carry a LRS team in support of WASO/CAM.

- Requirement for enhanced simulation (L-V-C-G) to support training in complex operating environments:

  ▪ Tailorable V-C-G simulation capabilities to replicate the uncertainty and complexity of the operational
    environment (SIGINT, HUMINT, cultural sensitivities)

  ▪ Avatar capable virtual & gaming simulations to train cultural awareness and use of interpreters